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GAYLORD V. UNITED STATES
 American copyright law’s “primary objective . . . is to encourage the production 
of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the good of the public.”1 To 
accomplish this goal, the Copyright Act not only incentivizes artistic creation by 
giving artists and creators a bag of exclusive rights to exploit for a limited period of 
time,2 but it also limits those rights through the doctrine of “fair use.”3 Fair use plays 
the vital role of balancing “the interests of authors and inventors in the control and 
exploitation of their [works] on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the 
free f low of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand.”4 It recognizes that 
“in art, there are . . . few, if any, things, which, in the abstract sense, are strictly new 
and original,”5 and that on occasion artists must be allowed to borrow from existing 
art if creativity is to prosper.6 Thus, robust protection of the fair use doctrine is 
essential to ensuring that copyright law promotes, and does not threaten, creativity.7 
 In Gaylord v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
considered the issue of fair use directly.8 The plaintiff, sculptor Frank Gaylord, 
claimed that the U.S. Postal Service infringed his copyright in part of the Korean 
War Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., by releasing a commemorative stamp 
that incorporated a photograph of the memorial without his permission.9 Mr. 
Gaylord also claimed that the Postal Service was not entitled to the affirmative 
defense of fair use codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107.10 At trial, the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims disagreed with Mr. Gaylord, finding that the stamp constituted fair use and 
that, therefore, the Postal Service did not infringe his copyright in the memorial.11 
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed both of these findings, declining to protect 
the stamp under the fair use doctrine.12 This case comment contends that the Federal 
Circuit misapplied the § 107 fair use factors in deciding Gaylord. In particular, the 
court erred in declining to recognize the unique and transformative nature of the 
stamp, giving too much weight to the memorial’s status as a creative work, and 
1. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994). 
2. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (providing copyright owners with exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, 
publicly perform, publicly display, and prepare derivatives of their work). 
3. See id. § 107.
4. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
5. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 
615, 619 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436)). 
6. See id. at 577 (“The fair use doctrine thus ‘permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the 
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stif le the very creativity which the law is designed to 
foster.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990))).
7. See id.
8. Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
9. Id. at 1368–72.
10. Id. at 1372.
11. Id. at 1371.
12. Id. at 1381.
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failing to render an opinion in accordance with the purpose of the Copyright Act. As 
a result, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Gaylord impermissibly stif les the creation 
and dissemination of publicly useful art in the United States.
 In 1986, Congress passed legislation authorizing the American Battle Monuments 
Commission to create a memorial on the National Mall honoring veterans of the 
Korean War.13 The Commission enlisted the help of the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, who selected Cooper-Lecky Architects “as the prime contractor for the 
creation, construction, and installation of the [m]emorial.”14 Both the Commission 
and Cooper-Lecky subsequently held competitions designed to pick the memorial’s 
sculptor.15 The Commission initially picked a team of architects from Penn State 
University who proposed creating “38 larger-than-life granite soldiers in formation,” 
but that team later withdrew from the project.16 Cooper-Lecky then sponsored a 
second contest and picked Frank Gaylord as the memorial’s sculptor.17
 Mr. Gaylord began working on the memorial in 1990 and his final sculptural 
contribution, known as The Column, was installed on the National Mall in 
Washington, D.C., on May 1, 1995.18 In keeping with the basic ideas of the Penn 
State team, The Column “featured 19 stainless steel statues representing a platoon of 
foot soldiers in formation.”19 The statues were staggered and incorporated into the rest 
of the memorial, which included “landscaping, a mural, and granite plates representing 
the reflection of rice paddies at the soldiers’ feet.”20 Mr. Gaylord filed five copyright 
registrations in his name relating only to his soldier statues, including one registration 
for the statues as they appeared on the National Mall after installation.21
 Throughout 1995 and 1996, amateur photographer John Alli made five or six 
trips to the memorial at different times of the day and year.22 During one such visit 
in January 1996, he spent two hours taking about one hundred photographs of the 
memorial after a snowstorm.23 These photographs captured Mr. Gaylord’s soldier 
sculptures “from various angles using different [camera] exposures and [under 
different] lighting conditions.”24 Mr. Alli then selected one of his photographs from 
13. Id. at 1368–69.
14. Id. at 1368.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1368–69.
19. Id. at 1368 (quoting Gaylord v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 59, 63 (2008), rev’d, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 
2010)).
20. Id. at 1369. 
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1369–70.
24. Id. at 1370.
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that snowy day “as a retirement gift for his father,” a Korean War veteran.25 He titled 
the photograph Real Life,26 and it subsequently “won first place in a Naval Institute 
Press photo contest.”27
 In 2002, the U.S. Postal Service paid Mr. Alli $1,500 for the right to incorporate 
Real Life into a thirty-seven-cent postage stamp “commemorating the 50th 
anniversary of the armistice of the Korean War.”28 As issued, the stamp featured a 
modified image of Real Life,29 in which fourteen of Mr. Gaylord’s nineteen soldier 
statues from The Column were recognizable.30 Approximately 86.8 million Real Life 
stamps were issued until the design was retired in March 2005.31 The Postal Service 
generated approximately $5.4 million in revenue from the sale of Real Life stamps to 
collectors, in addition to receiving revenue from those stamps sold to the general 
public for use as postage.32
 On July 25, 2006, Mr. Gaylord brought suit against the United States in the 
Court of Federal Claims alleging that the Postal Service infringed his copyright in 
The Column by issuing a stamp that contained an image of his soldier sculptures.33 In 
response, the government argued that the Postal Service made fair use of The Column 
pursuant to section 107 of the Copyright Act,34 and the district court agreed.35
 The § 107 fair use factors, dealt with in more detail below, require a court to 
analyze (1) the “purpose and character” of the new, secondary work,36 (2) the nature 
of the underlying copyrighted work, (3) the amount of the copyrighted work used in 
the secondary work, and (4) the secondary work’s effect on the value of the 
copyrighted work.37 In applying these factors, the court determined that the Real Life 
stamp’s character was transformative because it exhibited a “new and different 
25. Id. at 1369.
26. Id. at 1370.
27. Gaylord v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 59, 63 (2008), rev’d, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
28. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1370.
29. Gaylord, 85 Fed. Cl. at 69–70. (“The Postal Service . . . [made] the color in the ‘Real Life’ photo even 
grayer, creating a nearly monochromatic image.”).
30. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1375. 
31. Id. at 1371.
32. Id.
33. Gaylord, 85 Fed. Cl. at 62.
34. Id. at 66, 68. 
35. Id. at 71. The government also argued that The Column was a work of joint authorship between itself 
and Mr. Gaylord, but the district court rejected this argument on the grounds that “Mr. Gaylord 
performed virtually all of the artistic work on the sculptures” and because there was no evidence that the 
parties intended to create a joint work. Id. at 66–67. 
36. This is often an inquiry into whether the secondary work is transformative—whether it adds a “further 
purpose or different character” to the copyrighted work through the addition of “new expression, 
meaning, or message.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). See infra notes 
80–87 and accompanying text.
37. 17 U.S.C § 107 (2006). 
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character and expression” from The Column;38 The Column’s status as a creative work 
was unimportant because the stamp “did not copy Mr. Gaylord’s creation in an effort 
to exploit its virtues,” but rather created “a new, surrealistic vision”;39 and the stamp 
had no adverse impact on The Column’s present or future value.40 The court found 
that only the third factor, regarding the amount of the copyrighted work used, tipped 
in favor of Mr. Gaylord.41 Therefore, since three of the four factors favored fair use, 
the district court found that Mr. Gaylord’s copyright was not infringed by the Real 
Life stamp.42
 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s finding.43 Specifically, 
the court disagreed with the district court’s analysis of the first fair use factor, i.e., 
the “purpose and character” of the secondary work.44 The court determined the 
stamp was not transformative in purpose because it shared an identical purpose with 
The Column—“to honor veterans of the Korean War”—and did not transform The 
Column’s character by merely muting its colors and adding snow.45 According to the 
appellate court, “[n]ature’s decision to snow cannot deprive Mr. Gaylord of an 
otherwise valid right to exclude.”46 Furthermore, the court found that the stamp’s 
commercial character weighed against fair use,47 as did its determination that the 
stamp did not use The Column as part of “a larger commentary or criticism.”48 On the 
basis of the foregoing, the Federal Circuit determined that the first fair use factor 
weighed heavily against fair use.49
 In applying the remainder of the fair use factors, the Federal Circuit determined 
that the second factor, the “nature of the copyrighted work,” weighed heavily against 
fair use “given the overall creative and expressive nature” of The Column.50 The court 
also determined that the third factor, the amount of the copyrighted work used, 
weighed against fair use because the stamp incorporated a substantial number of Mr. 
38. Gaylord, 85 Fed. Cl. at 69.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 70–71.
41. Id. at 69–70 (“The Postal Service’s use of many of the statues weighs against fair use. This fact is somewhat 
mitigated, however, by the [fact that] . . . . [t]he statues were not copied verbatim in the [s]tamp.”).
42. Id. at 71.
43. Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
44. Id. at 1372–74.
45. Id. at 1373–74.
46. Id. at 1374.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1373 (“Works that make fair use of copyrighted material often transform the purpose or character 
of the [copyrighted] work by incorporating it into a larger commentary or criticism. . . . By contrast, here 
the stamp did not use The Column as part of a commentary or criticism.”).
49. Id. at 1374.
50. Id.
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Gaylord’s soldier statues.51 However, in addressing the fourth factor, the circuit court 
found “no clear error” in the district court’s finding that the stamp did not adversely 
affect The Column’s present or future market value.52 Nonetheless, having determined 
that three of the four § 107 factors weighed against fair use, the Federal Circuit held 
the Postal Service liable for infringement of Mr. Gaylord’s copyright in The Column.53 
 This case comment contends that the Federal Circuit incorrectly decided Gaylord 
by misconstruing the first and second fair use factors. Specifically, the court erred in 
its analysis of the first factor by dismissing the ways in which the Real Life stamp 
transformed The Column by giving it a further purpose and different expressive 
character. The court also placed too much emphasis on the commercial nature of the 
stamp and mistakenly suggested that it lacked transformative value because it was 
not part of “a larger commentary or criticism.”54 In analyzing the second factor, the 
court gave too much weight to The Column’s status as a creative work in light of 
Supreme Court precedent. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit’s narrow construction of 
§ 107 suppresses the creation and dissemination of original artistic work in the 
United States, and it does not further the purpose of the Copyright Act.
 The fair use doctrine, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107, places substantive limits upon 
the rights of copyright owners.55 The statute reads:
[F]air use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright. In 
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair 
use the factors to be considered shall include—(1) the purpose and character 
of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) 
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.56
The Supreme Court has determined that fair use is a mixed question of law and 
fact,57 and that courts are to consider its applicability on a case-by-case basis.58 “[T]he 
doctrine is an equitable rule of reason,”59 and all of the factors “are to be explored, 
51. Id. at 1375.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1381.
54. Id. at 1373.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (“Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair Use.”).
56. Id.
57. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
58. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560; 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984). Although there are no 
“categories of presumptively fair use,” the preamble to 17 U.S.C. § 107 indicates that uses “for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research” are among the types of uses most often found to be fair. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 
576 (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988)).
59. Sony, 464 U.S. at 448 n.31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”60 Thus, 
application of the fair use doctrine requires a “sensitive balancing of interests.”61
 In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the “central 
purpose” of the first fair use factor is to determine whether the new, secondary work 
“merely supersedes” the original work, or whether it “adds something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new 
work is transformative.”62 A finding of “transformative use is not absolutely necessary 
for a finding of fair use,” but transformative works “lie at the heart” of the fair use 
doctrine because they tend to further copyright law’s goal of promoting original 
artistic expression.63 Therefore, a finding of transformative use weighs strongly in 
favor of fair use.64
 The Campbell transformation test is one of broad applicability and courts have 
applied it in a range of cases.65 For example, in Blanch v. Koons, an artist incorporated 
a copyrighted photograph from a fashion magazine into a collage painting to express 
his views about contemporary American culture, and the Second Circuit found the 
use to be transformative under Campbell.66 The court stated, “When, as here, the 
copyrighted work is used as raw material, in the furtherance of distinct creative or 
communicative objectives, the use is transformative.”67 In other words, the collage 
painting in Koons was transformative because it added a “further purpose or different 
character”68 to the underlying work.
 Likewise, in Gaylord, Mr. Alli’s Real Life photograph added new expressive 
character to The Column because, at the very least, it captured Mr. Alli’s own 
personality and artistic choices.69 Mr. Alli visited the memorial five or six times over 
60. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
61. Id. at 584 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40 (1984)).
62. Id. at 579 (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1164–67 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying Campbell 
in the context of finding Google’s use of thumbnails in its search engine to be transformative fair use); 
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that “an artist’s appropriation of a copyrighted 
image in a collage painting” is transformative fair use and that “the broad principles of [the] Campbell 
[transformative test] are not limited to cases involving parody”); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling 
Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006) (determining use of Grateful Dead posters and tickets in a 
biographical book to be transformative fair use under Campbell); Lennon v. Premise Media Corp, 556 F. 
Supp. 2d 310, 322–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that a documentary’s use of a short song clip was 
transformative fair use); Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d 442, 446–47 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (holding that the use of film clips in a performer’s biography was transformative under Campbell). 
66. See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 253. 
67. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
69. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (holding that copyright 
protection extends “to those components of a work that are original to the author”).
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the course of several months before deciding that the Real Life photograph best 
represented his artistic vision;70 and, in recognition of his artistic achievement, the 
photograph won first place in a U.S. Naval Institute photography contest. Yet, the 
appellate court gave no weight to Mr. Alli’s unique choice of expression as 
incorporated in the Postal Service’s stamp, at one point claiming that “[n]ature’s 
decision to snow cannot deprive Mr. Gaylord of an otherwise valid right to exclude.”71 
This was in error. 
 A Picture of THE COLUMN.72 John Alli’s REAL LIFE An Enlarged Image of the 
  Photograph.73 Postage Stamp.74
 Mr. Alli chose to photograph The Column after a winter snowstorm, from a 
particular angle, with a precise camera exposure, and under certain lighting 
conditions.75 These choices resulted in a photograph that transformed The Column, a 
collection of stainless steel sculptures, into a one-dimensional, surrealistic photograph 
“with snow and subdued lighting where the viewer is left unsure whether he is 
viewing a photograph of statues or actual human beings.”76 Furthermore, when 
incorporating Real Life into a stamp, the Postal Service made Mr. Alli’s image 
“greyer” and more “monochromatic.”77 These changes made Mr. Gaylord’s soldier 
statues appear “colder”78 and more lifelike than in Mr. Alli’s photograph, imbuing 
the stamp with still more expressive character not inherent in The Column itself.79 As 
70. Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
71. Id. at 1374. The Federal Circuit also determined that the transformative “inquiry must focus on the 
purpose and character of the stamp, rather than that of Mr. Alli’s photograph,” thereafter declining to 
give any weight to Mr. Alli’s artistic choices. Id. at 1373. Mr. Alli’s artistic choices, however, should not 
be dismissed so readily, as they were intentionally incorporated into, and made part of, the Real Life 
stamp, albeit with further alteration by the Postal Service.
72. Id. at 1369, available at http://iplaw.hllaw.com/uploads/file/90370.PDF. Due to publication formatting 
restrictions, the color has been stripped from the above image.
73. Id. at 1370. Due to publication formatting restrictions, the color has been stripped from the above image.
74. Id. at 1371. Due to publication formatting restrictions, the color has been stripped from the above image.
75. See id. at 1369–70.
76. Gaylord v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 59, 68–69 (2008), rev’d, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
77. Id. at 69.
78. Id.
79. See id.
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a result, the stamp took on a clearly delineated and uniquely nostalgic quality, an 
attribute most appropriate for commemorating the Korean War.
 The Federal Circuit was also incorrect to conclude that the Real Life stamp 
served no “further purpose” than that of The Column.80 Unlike The Column itself, 
which was authorized by Congress in 1986 to honor Korean War veterans generally, 
the stamp, issued in 2002, was specifically intended to commemorate the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Korean War, and it was released with that new purpose in mind.81 
The stamp also served a further purpose by conveying a different message to its 
viewers than The Column. As the district court found, a viewer of Mr. Alli’s 
photograph “experiences a feeling of stepping into the photograph” and “being in 
Korea with the soldiers, under [] freezing conditions.”82 The Real Life stamp builds 
upon and conveys a similar surrealistic message. This message is not inherent in Mr. 
Gaylord’s three-dimensional metal sculpture on the National Mall, which, relative to 
the stamp, distances the viewer and exhibits more traditional monument-like 
qualities. Furthermore, while viewers of The Column may visit Mr. Gaylord’s statutes, 
and observe them from different angles and under varying weather conditions, the 
Real Life stamp provided a new opportunity for stamp collectors and the public to 
join in commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War by sending or 
collecting a uniquely expressive postage stamp.83
 In Campbell, the Supreme Court determined that works involving parody have an 
“obvious claim” to transformative value because they “can provide social benefit, by 
shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one.”84 The 
Real Life stamp, while not a parody, provides a similar type of transformative value 
by adding new, expressive character to The Column for the socially valuable purpose 
of commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War. The stamp cannot be 
said to have duplicated or “merely supersede[d]”85 The Column. The two works are not 
substitutes for one another, as “[s]omeone seeking to take a photograph of The 
Column or otherwise create a derivative work [of The Column] would not find the 
80. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1373 (“Both the stamp and The Column share a common purpose: to honor veterans 
of the Korean War.” (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994))). 
81. See id. at 1368–70. Even if one takes the view, as the appellate court did, that the stamp does not reflect 
any meaningful further purpose, it is not fatal to the argument that the stamp is transformative. This is 
because the Campbell test is disjunctive, requiring a transformative secondary work to serve either a 
“further purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with new expression, meaning, or message.” 
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (emphasis added). Furthermore, § 107 does not require that fair use works 
have a totally different purpose from the original copyrighted work, but rather instructs the court to 
consider the secondary work’s purpose as part of its fair use analysis. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
82. Gaylord, 85 Fed. Cl. at 69.
83. This is not to suggest that a change in medium (e.g., memorial to stamp), without more, is enough to 
make a secondary work transformative (rather than just derivative). Nonetheless, a change in medium 
helps to establish that a secondary work will indeed be serving a different purpose in the marketplace 
than the original copyrighted work.
84. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
85. Id. (holding that a transformative work does not “merely supersede[] the original work”).
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stamp to be a suitable substitute for The Column itself.”86 To use language from Koons, 
the stamp incorporated The Column as “‘raw material’ in the furtherance of [a] 
distinct creative or communicative objective[].”87 Simply stated, The Column was 
transformed, first by Mr. Alli and then by the Postal Service, and the resulting 
product acquired a further purpose and substantially different expressive character 
than Mr. Gaylord’s original creation. On this basis alone, the Federal Circuit should 
have found that the first § 107 factor weighed in favor of fair use.
 Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit went on to attack the stamp’s fair use value on 
the basis of its commercial nature as a postage stamp.88 Precedent does not warrant 
this given the stamp’s transformative value.89 As stated in Campbell, § 107 clearly 
indicates that a secondary work’s commercial nature “is only one element of the first 
factor enquiry into its purpose and character,” and that “the more transformative the 
new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism.”90 
The Second Circuit followed this guidance in Blanch when it found that the first 
factor weighed in favor of fair use despite the fact that the collage painting at issue 
(which was deemed transformative) sold commercially for $126,877.91 In Gaylord, 
given the stamp’s transformative value, the Federal Circuit should have likewise 
discounted its commercial nature as a postage stamp. Transformative secondary 
86. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1375.
87. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
88. See Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1374 (“The Postal Service acknowledged receiving $17 million from the sale of 
nearly 48 million 37-cent stamps. An estimated $5.4 million in stamps were sold to collectors in 
2003. . . . Because the stamp did not have a further purpose or different character, and because it had a 
commercial use, we conclude that this factor weighs strongly against fair use.”). “The crux of the profit/
nonprofit distinction,” i.e., the commercialism inquiry, should not be “whether the sole motive of the 
[secondary] use is monetary gain,” as the Federal Circuit seemed to imply, “but whether the user stands 
to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price.” Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). Here, it is undisputed that the Postal 
Service increased its revenue by releasing the stamp, but the Postal Service also paid Mr. Alli $1,500 for 
the use of Real Life, Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1370, and there is no indication that Mr. Gaylord could have 
negotiated a higher licensing fee himself. Therefore, it is not entirely clear that the Postal Service 
exploited The Column, as incorporated into Mr. Alli’s Real Life photograph, “without paying the 
customary price,” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562. In this respect, the Federal Circuit was incorrect to 
look solely at the Postal Service’s revenue from the Real Life stamp in determining how much weight to 
give the stamp’s for-profit status in analyzing the commercialism prong of the first § 107 factor. 
Nonetheless, for the purposes of this case comment, analysis of the second § 107 factor assumes, 
arguendo, that the postage stamp is indeed commercial in nature.
89. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
90. Id.; see A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding the “commercial aspect . . . 
not significant in light of the transformative nature of [defendant’s] use”); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.
com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 2007); Blanch, 467 F.3d at 254; L.A. News Serv. v. CBS 
Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 939–40 (9th Cir. 2002) (transformative use “reduced the importance of the 
commerciality of the use”); Higgins v. Detroit Educ. Television Found., 4 F. Supp. 2d 701, 706 (E.D. 
Mich. 1998) (“[T]he transformative nature of the use neutralized the commercialism.”).
91. See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 253–54. (“[S]ince the new work is substantially transformative, . . . [w]e therefore 
discount[] the secondary commercial nature of the use.” (third alteration in original) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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works warrant this treatment because they do not trade on the expressive value of the 
copyrighted work itself, but rather minimize its importance to achieve a new and 
different artistic vision.92 As such, the commercial nature of the postage stamp 
should not have weighed against a finding of fair use.
 The Federal Circuit also mistakenly suggested that the Real Life stamp contained 
no transformative value because it did not use The Column as part of “a larger 
commentary or criticism.”93 The broad transformative use test set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Campbell contains no such explicit requirement,94 and implying 
such a requirement unduly impinges upon the creation and dissemination of original 
artistic expression. Campbell only maintains, albeit in dicta, that certain secondary 
works not containing comment or criticism of an incorporated copyrighted work 
require some “ justification for the very act of borrowing.”95 This is because such 
works could presumably “stand on [their] own two feet” without reference to, or the 
incorporation of, an original copyrighted work.96 As applied in Blanch, determining 
whether there is justification for incorporating a copyrighted work into a new work is 
an inquiry into whether the artist “had a genuine creative rationale for borrowing.”97 
It is not an inquiry into the merits of the secondary work itself.98
 Even assuming arguendo that a justification for borrowing from The Column was 
necessary, Mr. Alli, a diligent amateur photographer, was unquestionably justified in 
using The Column to bring his expression of the Korean War into existence. Where 
else could he have photographed soldiers in formation? Presumably nowhere. 
Likewise, it would have been absurd to require Mr. Alli or the Postal Service to take 
photographic equipment into a modern-day war zone or to sculpt their own soldier 
statues in an effort to achieve the photographic vision inherent in the Real Life stamp. 
In this respect, Mr. Alli and the Postal Service were not trying to “avoid the drudgery 
92. See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 2006); Blanch, 467 
F.3d at 257.
93. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1373. To be more specific, the Federal Circuit stated that “[w]orks that make fair 
use of copyrighted material often transform the purpose and character of the [copyrighted] work by 
incorporating it into a larger commentary or criticism” and used the stamp’s lack of commentary or 
criticism to “conclude that the stamp does not transform the character of The Column” under Campbell. 
Id. (emphasis added).
94. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. For example, in Perfect 10, the Ninth Circuit explicitly applied Campbell and 
found that Google’s use of thumbnails in its search engine, which contained no comment or criticism, 
was a “highly transformative” secondary use given its “public benefit.” Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1164–67. 
95. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81 (“Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some 
claim to use the creation of its victim’s . . . imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and 
so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.”).
96. Id.
97. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 255.
98. Id.; see Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582 (“[I]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the 
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a work], outside of the narrowest and most 
obvious limits.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 
U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
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in working up something fresh”99 by incorporating The Column into the stamp. The 
Postal Service “did not copy Mr. Gaylord’s creation in an effort to [simply] exploit its 
virtues.”100 Rather, use of The Column was ancillary to the creation of a new and 
transformative artistic vision. In Blanch, the court declined to use its self-proclaimed 
“poorly honed artistic sensibilities” to second-guess an artist’s personal creative 
justifications for using an existing work.101 The Federal Circuit in Gaylord should 
have shown similar deference to the artistic decisions of Mr. Alli and, ultimately, the 
Postal Service.
 This case comment now turns brief ly to the Federal Circuit’s analysis of the 
second fair use factor under § 107, the “nature of the copyrighted work.”102 As 
explained in Campbell, the second factor “calls for recognition that some works are 
closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the consequence 
that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied.”103 Two 
considerations are particularly important in looking at the second factor: (1) whether 
the copyrighted work is expressive or factual in nature, with more protection being 
afforded to expressive works, and (2) whether the copyrighted work is published or 
unpublished, with less protection being provided to publicly available published 
works.104 Notably, Campbell found that the second factor is not “ever likely to help 
much in separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats” in cases where the 
copyrighted work is both expressive and “publicly known.”105
 In Gaylord, The Column is expressive in nature106 and it is “perhaps the epitome of 
a published work” because it is “part of a national monument.”107 Therefore, The 
Column fits into the category of “publicly known, expressive works”108 described in 
99. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
100. Gaylord v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 59, 69 (2008), rev’d, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
101. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 255. See generally Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251 (holding that it is “dangerous” for judges 
to adjudicate the artistic merits of a work).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
103. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
104. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 256.
Two types of distinctions as to the nature of the copyrighted work have emerged that 
have figured in the decisions evaluating the second factor: (1) whether the work is 
expressive or creative, such as a work of fiction, or more factual, with a greater leeway 
being allowed to a claim of fair use where the work is factual or informational, and (2) 
whether the work is published or unpublished, with the scope for fair use involving 
unpublished works being considerably narrower.
 Id. (quoting 2 Howard B. Abrams, The Law of Copyright § 15:52 (2006)).
105. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
106. See Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“We see no clear error in the Court 
of Federal Claims’ finding that The Column is expressive and creative.”).
107. Id. at 1374.
108. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
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Campbell, and the importance of the second factor should be given less significance.109 
The Federal Circuit, however, neither mitigated nor neutralized the importance of 
the second factor in Gaylord, but instead determined that The Column’s “overall 
creative and expressive nature” weighed against fair use.110 This determination was 
particularly misplaced in light of the fact that some courts have found it necessary to 
further discount the expressive nature of an underlying work when the secondary 
work is transformative,111 as is the case with the Real Life stamp. Given the public 
nature of The Column and the transformative nature of the stamp, the Federal Circuit 
was misguided in weighing the second factor against fair use.
 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held that the first two factors weighed against a 
finding of fair use and, thus, in favor of holding the Postal Service liable for copyright 
infringement.112 The court also found that the third factor weighed against fair use 
since the Real Life stamp incorporated a substantial number of Mr. Gaylord’s soldier 
statues,113 but that the fourth factor favored fair use because the stamp had no adverse 
impact on the value of The Column.114 Nonetheless, since the Federal Circuit 
determined that a majority of the factors favored infringement, the court denied fair 
use protection to the Postal Service.115 Had the court weighed the first and second 
fair use factors according to the analysis provided above, it would have come to the 
opposite conclusion. Unfortunately, though, the court declined to recognize the 
transformative nature of the stamp and did not properly discount the importance of 
The Column’s status as an expressive work in light of Supreme Court precedent.
 No doubt, a tension exists in American copyright law between the “need 
simultaneously to protect copyrighted material and to allow others to build upon 
it.”116 However, the guiding purpose of copyright law is not to protect copyright 
holders per se, but rather to encourage and incentivize the creation of original artistic 
expression for the benefit of the public.117 Therefore, in situations where the public 
109. See, e.g., Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., L.P., 556 F.Supp.2d 310, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing 
Campbell and holding that the second fair use factor weighs in favor of fair use partly because the 
copyrighted work is a creative and widely published song). 
110. See Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1374.
111. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 257 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he second factor may be of limited usefulness 
where the creative work of art is being used for a transformative purpose.” (quoting Bill Graham 
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 2006))).
112. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1372–74.
113. Id. at 1375.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1376.
116. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994).
117. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) (“We have often recognized the monopoly 
privileges that Congress has authorized, while ‘intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and 
inventors by the provision of a special reward,’ are limited in nature and must ultimately serve the public 
good.” (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984))); Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The primary objective of copyright is 
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benefit of a creative secondary work substantially outweighs any potential harm to 
the copyright holder, the secondary work should be deemed fair and legal.118 
Otherwise, the creation of new artistic expression is stif led “without serving any 
legitimate interest of the copyright holder.”119
 In Gaylord, the Real Life stamp does not trade on the expressive value of The 
Column given its transformative nature; and, as the Federal Circuit and the Court of 
Federal Claims both agreed, the stamp “has not and will not adversely impact Mr. 
Gaylord’s efforts to market derivative works of The Column.”120 Furthermore, the 
uniquely expressive Real Life stamp presented the public with a new way in which to 
remember and commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War. Denying 
the stamp fair use protection under these circumstances does not further the purpose 
of the Copyright Act. Rather, it places an impermissible chilling effect upon the 
creation of publicly useful artistic expression and threatens the dissemination of 
creativity throughout the United States.121
not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” (alteration 
in original) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
118. See Matthew D. Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The “Transformative” Use Doctrine After Campbell, 7 Comm. 
L. & Pol’y 1, 21 (2002) (“Fair use should properly be an analysis of the public benefit of dissemination 
of the work . . . balanced against the commercial harm to the statutory rights of the copyright holder.”).
119. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Where the 
infringement is small in relation to the new work created, the fair user is profiting largely from his own 
creative efforts rather than free-riding on another’s work. A prohibition on all copying whatsoever 
would stif le the free f low of ideas without serving any legitimate interest of the copyright holder.”).
120. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1375. 
121. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 524 (“The primary objective of the Copyright Act is to encourage the production of 
original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the good of the public.”).
